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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
A'l'ToRNEY ANn CLttNT-AT'l'ORNEY's CHARGING Lum.-Having agreed by contract to pay his attorney fifty percent of the proceeds recovered, the client,
while suit was pending, and without the consent of his attorney, settled with
the defendant for $30. The attorney then gave notice of his claim to the
defendant, and the district court, after hearing the case, gave judgment to
the plaintiff attorney for $100. There was a statute (N. J. LAWS OF 1914 ch.
201, p. 410) which gave a lien to an attorney on the proceeds of a settlement
out of court. Held, the action of the district court was unwarranted, in
the face of the written contract, which entitled the attorney to only fifty
percent of the settlement. Levy v. P11blic Service R3•. Co. (N. J. 19I6),
98 At!. 847.
It has been said that the attorney's charging and possessory liens were
unknown at the common law, but as far back as Reed Y. D11pper (1795),
6 T. R. 36!, they were recognized by Lord KENYON; see also the reference
to such liens in the recent case of Prichard v. Fttlmer (New Mex., 1916),
159 Pac. 39. Of recent years such liens have been largely regulated by
statute. In the absence of notice to the adverse party, and of a statute protecting the lien, the parties generally may compromise or settle a cause
of action before judgment, regardless of the rights of the attorneys, unless
the compromise or settlement was for the purpose of depriving the attorneys of their fees. Kaufman v. Keenan, 2 N. Y. Supp. 395. If the settlement, however, provides for the lien, it will be upheld. Lee v. Vamum Oil
Co., 126 N. Y. 579, 27 N. E. 1018. After judgment, and after the lien has
been properly perfected by notice_ or otherwise, a compromise cannot prejudice
the attorney's right to enforce the judgment to the extent of the lien. 4 CYc.
1020. The tendency of the courts is to protect the attorney, as an officer of
the court, even in cases of a settlement by the client before notice by the
attorney of his lien. In Weeks v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 73 Mich. 256, satisfactions of judgments entered by the client were set aside in order to reinstate the attorney's lien, that he might enforce it to the extent of his lien
by execution. Some courts have even gone so far as to allow an attorney,
having a lien on the cause of action, to proceed to try the case to determine
and collect the amount of his fee, after a settlement by his client. Jolz11so11
v. J'J1cC11rry, 102 Ga. 471. See also St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Blaylock, ·n7
Ark. 504. 175 S. W. n70; Bell v. Co111missio11ers, 26 Colo. App. 192, 141 Pac.
861. By the strict rule, however, the attorney is left to his action on the
quantum meruit in case of settlement before judgment and notice. Day v.
Larson, 30 Ore. 247; Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. -, 71 So. 774.
BANKRUPTCY-LIABILITY FOR MALICrous INJURY To PROPERTY NoT DisCHARGEo.-Plaintiff pledged stock certificates to defendant, who sold them
without the former's authority. Defendant set up his subsequent discharge
in bankruptcy as a defense to a suit for such conversion. On the ground
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that the liability was for willful and malicious injury to property, within
the meaning of § 17 (2), as amended in 1903, the debt was held not to be
discharged. Mcbit~/re v. Kavanaugh (1916) 37 Sup. Ct. 38.
This claim was based on an implied contract and hence provable under
§ 63 (4), Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176. The sole question is whether
there must be malice toward the individual personally in order to satisfy
the requirements of § 17 (2). The court says that to hold affirmatively
would be too narrow a construction, quoting with approval the leading case
of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 485, 487, to the effect that the cause
of action need not be based upon special malice. It is said in Peters v. United
States ex rel Kelley, 177 Fed. 885, 101 C. C. A. 99, that "the term
'willful and malicious infury' as used in § 17 (2) of the Bankruptcy Act
* * * does not involve ill will or hatred as a state of mind." In Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cres. 347, which was an action of slander, Mr.
Justice BAYLEY laid down the rule that "Malice in common acceptation means
ill will against a person, but in its legal sense, it means a wrongful act, done
intentionally, without just cause or excuse. If I maim cattle, without knowing whose they are * * * it is done of malice because it is wrongful and
intentional. * * * It equally works an injury whether I meant to produce
an injury or not." What is contemplated, according to the Tinker case,
followed in the principal case, is a "willful disregard of what one knows to
be his duty, an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of
itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally." It is
thus seen that the fiction of malice is sufficient, under § 17 (2) to prevent
a discharge of debts which are liabilities for malicious injury to the person
or property of another. In Tinker v. Colwell, the "malicious" act was criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife; in Parker v. Brittain, 120 Md. 428,
87 Atl. 756, slander; in Hallagan v. Dowell, 139 N. W. 833, conversion of
money; in In re Mmiro, 197 Fed. 450, wrongfully keeping lessee's wife off
land by means of force and threats; in Bever v. Swecker, 138 Ia. 721, 116 N.
W. 704, taking plaintiff's cattle without his consent; in In re Halper, 143 N.
Y. Supp. 1005, 82 Misc. 205, mistakenly and negligently giving pure carbolic
acid instead of diluted. But in Tompkins v. Williams, 122 N. Y. Supp. 152,
in which chloral was given an intoxicated guest at an inn to keep him quiet
and to prevent injury to himself and others, the act was held not "malicious,"
two of the five judges dissenting. The first five cases are clearly within
the rules laid down in the Prosser and Colwell cases, supra, but the last
two cases are harder of determination. It would be interesting to note
whether the acts would have been done without just cause or excuse, within
the meaning of the Prosser case, or in "willful disregard of what was known'
to b~ his duty, etc.", within the meaning of the Tinker case- that is whether
malice would be implied-if in the latter case the defendant had mistaken
plaintiff's wife for' his own or in the Bever case, the cattle for his own, or in
the Tompkins case, had intended to administer less chloral but someone had
increased the dose while defendant's back was turned, or in the Halper
case someone had placed an incorrect label on the bottle.
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BILLS AND NoTES-DISCOUNTING BANK AS PURCHASER FOR VALUt.-Defendant bank discounted a draft, placed the proceeds to the credit of the
drawer, and forwarded draft to its correspondent for collection. The pro<:eeds were attached in the hands of the correspondent bank as the property
of the drawer. Defendant bank intervened, claiming it had purchased the
draft. Plaintiff, who attached the proceeds, contends the bank is not a
purchaser for value since the drawer at all times had credit as depositor
with the bank above the face of the draft. Held, that crediting the account
of the drawer (with a right to check thereon) is evidence of a purchase
for value without regard to the state of the account, and the real question
is as to the intention of the parties-a question of fact rather than law, and
to be determined as such. Worth Co. v. Inter11atio11al Sugar Feed Co. (N.
C. 1916), 90 S. E. 295.
The contention of the plaintiff is supported by some decisions on the
ground that until the increased credit due to the proceeds of the draft is
drawn out the bank has not parted with any value but only promised to
pay the depositor, which promise becomes revocable on notice of any intervening equity or defense and the bank cannot thereafter become a bona
fide holder by paying the depositor. Mann v. Bank, 30 Kans. 412, l Pac. 579;
Blake v. Bank, 79 Oh. St. l8g, 87 N. E. 73; Bank v. Cowles, l8o N. Y. 346,
76 N. E. 33; Thompson v. Bank, 150 U. S. 231, 37 L. Ed. lo63; Bank v.
Newell, 71 Wis. 309. The mere credit of the proceeds upon the books of
the bank, which may be cancelled at any time, does not make the bank a
purchaser for value. Hazlett v. Banlt, 132 Penn. u8; Thompson v. Bank,
supra; Bank v. Valentine, 18 Hun. 417. Other cases hold that if unqualified
credit is given, it is as if the money was paid, and is a purchase. The
draft being received in good faith and credited as so much money the title
of the instrument is at once transferred to the bank. Wasson v. Lamb, 120
Ind. 415, 22 N. E. 729; Nat'l Bank v. Lloyd, go N. Y. 535; Taft v. Bank, 172
Mass. 365, 52 N. E. 387; Aebi v. Bank, 124 Wis. 73, 102 N. W. 328; Hoffman
v. Bank, 46 N. J. L. 004; Bank v. Burns, 68 Ala. 267; Ayers v. Bank, 79
Mo. 421. Still other jurisdictions support the view taken by the principal
ease. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566, 33 L. Ed. 683; Burton v. United
States, lg6 U. S. 302, 49 L. Ed. 482; Shaw v. Jones, 8g Iowa 713, 55 N. W.
333; Strong v. King, 35 Ill. 9, 85 Am. Dec. 336; Ditch v. Bank, 79 Md. 192,
47 Am. St. Rep. 38g; Fayette Bank v. S11111mers, 105 Va. 68g, 54 S. E. 862.
Some of the cases which are cited as contra to the rule as stated in the
principal case will be found on examination to recognize it impliedly-the
decisions being made in the absence of admissible evidence to rebut the
prima facie case made out by the application of either of the other rules
as stated. See Burtoi~ v. U. S., supra, and Scott v. Bank, 23 N. Y. 28g. It
does not appear that the Negotiable Instruments Law has changed these
rules. Chateau Trust Co. v. Smith, 133 Ky. 418, II8 S. W. 279; Wal/about
Bank v. Peyton, 108 N. Y. Supp. 42; Bank v. Walser, 162 N. C. 53, 77 S. E.
10o6. Since the agreement between the bank and the depositor.....:.whether
the bank buys the draft or only receives it for collection-depends funda-
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mentally upon the intention of the parties, it would seem that the holding
of the principal case is correct. Moon v. Simpson (N. C. 1916), 90 S. E.
578, is in accord.
BOUNDARIES-TITLE 'l'O BED OF NONNAVlGABLE LAKE.-Plaintiff and defendant own adjacent land on a small unnavigable lake, oval in shape. Defendant removed ice from this lake at a point immediately in front of
plaintiff's land, and the latter brings trespass for the alleged invasion. Held,
each abutting owner is entitled to the land under water in front of his
premises to the thread of the stream; judgment, therefore, for plaintiff.
Calkins v. Hart (N. Y. 1916), II3 N. E. 785.
It is the common law that riparian landowners take title ad medium filum
aquae, but there is no unanimity of decision as to the ownership of lake
beds. The question is always affected by the extent and navigability of the
water. Where the lake is small and unnavigable, the view adopted in the
instant case, that the abutting owners take to the center thereof, is the
prevailing one. Wilcox v. Bread, 37 N. Y. Supp, 867, affirmed 157 N. Y.
713, 53 N. E. II33; H ardfa v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. Ed. 428; Harrison
v. Fite, 148 Fed. 781, 78 C. C. A. 447; Provide11ce Hunting Clttb v. Miller
Mfg. Co., n7 Va. 557, 83 S. E. 1047; In re Tucker, 126 Minn. 214, 148 N. W.
60; Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 225 Pa. 6o5, 74 Atl. 648; Johnson v.
Elder, 92 Ark. 30, 121 S. W. 1066. Contra: Fuller v. Shedd, 161Ill.462, 44 N. E.
286; No~,ies v. Collins, 92 Ia. 566, 61 N. W. 250; Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 66 N. H. I, 25 Atl. 718; Robinson v. White, 42 Me. 209. In England the
law is likewise unsettled, see Bristow v. Cormican ( 1878), L. R. 3 App. Cas.
64r. The more perplexing problem still remains, namely, what is to be taken
as the center of the lake. The practical, difficulties of equitably dividing
the bed of an irregularly shaped lake are apparent, and the methods of
solution, suggested or aclJPted, are nc.t outnumbered by the geometrical
possibilities. Where, as in the principal case, one diameter distinguishably
exceeds the other, the common law rule applicable to unnavigable streams,
supra, has, in several cases, been suggested with approval, or adopted.
Hardin v. Jordan,' supra; Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102; Marshall v.
Steam Navigation Co., 3 Best & Smith 732; Ridgway v. Litdlow, 58 Ind.
248; Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336. For full discussion see BREWSTER,
CONVEYANCING, § § III-II8. In the principal case it was the theory of the
defense that the geographical center of the lake should be determined, and
the side boundary lines of each abutting lot extended thereto, thus giving
to each' owner a triangular strip of the lake bed. This plan of division' was
adopted in Schiefert v. Briegel, 90 Minn. 129; but in that case the lake was
nearly round. A review of the few decisions which discuss the problem
discloses no general rule which could be justly applied in all cases.
CARRIERS-LIABILI'l'Y FOR STATEMENTS OF CONDUCTOR.-Plaintiff bought a
ticket from Manning to Kingstree via Florence, at which place defendant's
printed schedule showed a misconnection. H;e relied on a statement made to
him five days before by a conductor on one of defendant's trains that the
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train scheduled to leave Florence shortly before the arrl\'al of the train from
Manning was customarily held to accommodate passengers for Kingstree.
He failed to make the connection, and was compelled to take a later train
from Florence. Held, that defendant was liable in damages for the delay.
Cleckley v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (S. ·C. 1916), go S. E. 32.
It is well settled that a railroad company is liable for delay proximately
resulting from the misdirection of a passenger by a servant of the company
having the requisite authority. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. White, 99 Tex.
359, 2 L. R. A. N. S. no, and note. The liability, however, has usually been
confined to cases of misdirection by a ticket agent at or shortly before the
purchase of the ticket, or by a station agent, gatekeeper, or brakeman at the
time of taking the train. Mace v. Soitthern Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 404, 24 L. R.
A. N. S. 1178 and note. Although it is not essential to the liability that the
misdirection be contemporaneous (Southern R. Co. v. Nowling, 156 Ala. 222,
47 So. 18o), it has been held that it will not bind the company i£ made a
considerable time ·before the purchase of the ticket (Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Cameron, 66 Fed. 709) and a casual statement by an agent, not a part
of the consideration on which the ticket was purchased, has been held not
to render the company liable for misdirection (Dresser v. Canadian Pac. Ry.
Co., 116 Fed. 281). A railroad company is not liable for a misdirection by
an agent outside the scope of his authority (Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Smith,
38 Tex. Civ. App. 4, 8.4 S. W. 852), and it has been held that the authority
of a conductor does not extend to making the company liable for damages
resulting from a reliance on promiscuous statements by him regarding the
operation of the road (Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 16 Tex. ·Civ.
App. 19, 40 S. W. 201; Gerardy v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 102 N. Y. Supp.
548, 52 Misc. 466). In the latter case it was held that the company was not
liable for damages resulting from a reliance on the statement of the ticket
agent, made at the time the ticket was purchased, and that of the conductor.
made at the time the train was boarded, that it would make up for lost time.
The facts in that case made a much stronger basis for liability than those
in the principal case, since the misdirection was contemporaneous with the
purchase of the ticket and the boarding of the train, and yet the liability was
denied. The principal case goes far to make the railroad company liable for
damage which, in the light of the previous decisions, might well have been
considered damnmn absque injuria.
CoNs'l'ITU'l'IONAL LAw-PoLICE Pow:iiR-EQUAL PRO'l'EC'l'ION oF LAw.-An

ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco provid~d that "no person or persons owning or employed in the public laundries or public wash
houses * * * shall wash, mangle, starch, iron, or do any other work on
clothes between the hours of 6 o'clock P. M. and 7 o'clock A. M." Held,
that the ordinance is unconstitutional. Yee Gee v. City and County of San
Francisco, 235 Fed. 757.
In reaching the above conclusion, the court gave consideration to the
two following problems: (a) Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unneces-
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sary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty? (b) Is the regulation reasonable in its relation to the ostensible ends sought to be accomplished? A similar ordinance in Barbier v. C011nolly, u3 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. ·Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923, was upheld as co~stitu
-tional; but in that case the hours during which labor was prohibited were
from IO P. M. to 6 A. M., leaving fourteen hoµrs in which labor in public
'laundries might be performed; while in the principal case, the prohibited
"hours extend from 6 P. M. to 7 A. M., leaving but eleven hours for labor.
It is well settled that the state in the exercise of its police power and for
the protection of the health, morals, and safety of its citizens may prescribe
the maximum number of hours for employment. Soom Hing v. Crowley,
u3 U. S. 707, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. II45; Holden v. Hardy, 16g U. S.
366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 78o. Every one would agree that the state
would be justified in passing a law prohibiting an employee from laboring
for eighteen or more hours per day, and on the other hand, no one would
-deny that it would be unreasonable to prohibit an employee from laboring
for more than two hours per day. There are two rights involved in any
:such regulation of labor: on the one hand, the power of the state to legislate;
-on the other, the right of individual freedom of contract. The former gives
the state the power to put a maximum on the number of hours which the
·employee may labor, the latter insures that this maximum number shall not
be too low. The two powers thus opposing must meet at some point. The
-determination of whether or not the effect of a given regulation confines
itself within the neutral space between these opposing rights is likely to be
more or less affected by the personal opinions, upon economic and social
problems, of the court which sits upon the question. Obviously, there can
:be no arbitrary gauge which can be applied to the law in question for the
purpose of determining that this law on the one hand is a proper occasion
for the application of the police power of the state, on the other hand, that
it is not such an extension of this power as will amount to an unjust de:privation of the freedom of contract. In Lochner v. New York, 1g8 U. S .
.45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. II33, the court by a vote of
£ve to four held a ten-hour law applicable to bakeries to be unconstitutional.
Whether or not a given law regulating hours of labor is or is not a proper
·exercise of the police power of the state can not be determined by an examination of precedents alone, but a fair and just solution of the problem
demands an exhaustive study of the particular law in question,-the trades
to which it is applicable, the physical surroundings of those working in that
trade with regard to air, noise, fumes, the benefit of protection that might
be derived from reducing the hours, and other considerations that will suggest themselves to the reader. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error in Bm1ti11g
v. Oregon, appeal now pending before United States Supreme Court;
"FA'.l'IGUE AND EFFICil:NCY;' by JOSEPHINE GoLDMARK. ·As to the second problem mentioned above, the court came to the conclusion that inasmuch as
one of the chief purposes in passing the ordinance was to reduce the danger
from fir~s which reduction of danger would result by compelling laundries to
dose their places of business at 6 P. M., the wording of the ordinance was
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broader than necessary for effecting this purpose. 'fhe ordinance was
equally applicable to all parts of the city, yet it was proved that there were·
many wholly unoccupied blocks where the maintenance of a laundry could
give rise to no conceivable danger of a general conflagration. The. ordinance was therefore held to be discriminatory, as its provisions were not
reasonably adapted to secure the ostensible end sought. It is interesting to
note that the California state court construing the same regulation, but in a:
different case, held it to be constitutional. E~ parte Wong Wing, 138 Pac.
695. But in that case the court considered only the first of the two problems outlined above, and did not enter into any discussion of whether or
not the ordinance was needlessly broad in its application. It will be observed that in Barbier v. C~mnelly, supra, the application of the ordinance
was limited to certain districts, presumably those which would be most endangered, by the maintenance of fires in these laundries during the prohibited
hours.
CONTRACTS-CONTRACT TO p AY IN K!ND.-Defendant bought brick from-.
plaintiffs, contracting to pay in kind, no time for payment being specified.
Defendant was willing that plaintiffs take sufficient brick from his kilns to
pay for those he had purchased, but made no offer to return any of them.
Plaintiffs never demanded payment in kind and several years later brought
this action to recover the value of the brick. The auditor found that Jan.
1, 1909, the year following the sale, would have been a reasonable time
within which defendant should have repaid in kind. Held, that defendant's
right to pay in specific articles and not in money was a privilege to be
exercised within a reasonable time and his failure to qo so perfected plaintiff's
right of action for the price of the brick, the contract not requiring a demand, and no special circumstances making a demand necessary before defendant could perform. Nelson & Wallace v. Gibso1i (Vt. 1916), 98 At!.

10o6.
The courts have generally agreed that a contract to pay in specific articles
on a day specified, if not fulfilled by delivery at the time fixed, becomes a
debt payable in money and that no demand is necessary. Marshall v. Ferguson, 23 Cal. 66; Games v. Manning, 2 Green (Ia.) 251; Stewart v. Morrow,.
1 Grant (Pa.) 204. In State v. Mooney, 65 Mo. 494, it was held that a demand and refusal was necessary to convert the agreement into an obligation to pay money, when the time of payment was indefinite. The same
conclusion has been reached in Ragland v. Wood, 71 Ala. 145; M cBaill v.
Austin, 16 Wis. 87; Isaacs v. N. Y. Plaster Works, 40 N. Y. Supr. Ct. Rep.
277; Newton v. Wales, 3 Robt. 453. The court in the principal case regarded·
the ri$"ht to pay in specific articles as a privilege to be exercised within a
reasonable time, when not otherwise specified by the parties. A formal demand would not have affected defendant's situation, since he knew where
to deliver the brick, and plaintiffs were not required to do anything before
he could act. The reasoning in this case is supported by Cass v. McDonald,.
39 Vt. 65, and McKimiie v. Laue, 230 Ill. 544. In most of the cases requiring demand where time is not specified, some act remained to be per-
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formed by the obligee to enable the obligor to deliver. They are not in
conflict with the principal case but are distinguishable because of special
facts or circumstances.
CoN'.l'RACTs-PERFoRMANCE oF CONTRACTUAL 0BLIGA'.l'ION.-Plaintiff agreed
with defendant to construct a portion of a roadbed. The sides of the cut
were to be left vertical but the condition of the soil made this impossible and
it was found necessary to remove a large amount of material not contemplated by the parties. Defendant promised additional compensation for this
extra labor. In an action by the plaintiff on the original contract the court
submitted the subsequent agreement to the jury. Defendant contended that
there was no consideration for the promise of extra pay, as plaintiff was
already legally bound to do the ·work. Held, that the additional burden not
contemplated in the ·first contract was a valid consideration for the subsequent prpmise, but the questions ought not to have been submitted to the
jury because it was not pleaded. Straw v. Temple (Utah l9I6), I59 Pac. 44.
The general rule is that a promise to pay additional compensation for doing
something under a subsisting contract which the promisee is already legally
bound to do is without consideration and unenforceable. Benedict v. GreenRobbins Co., 26 Cal. App. 468, I47 Pac. 486; Shriner v. Craft, I66 Ala. 146,
28 L. R. A. 450; TYear Bros. v. Schmelzer, 92 l\Io. App. 134; Sands v. Gillera11,
I44 N. Y. Supp. 337; Moran v. Peace, 72 Ill. App. I35; Bush v. Rawlins, 8g
Ga. n7. Some courts have taken the view that where one of the parties to
a contract (other than an agreement to pay money) refuses to perform the
same, and the other promises to pay extra compensation to induce him to
carry out his agreement, there is a valid consideration for the promise. Under
the reasoning in these cases the party has a right to elect whether he will
perform the contract or abandon it and pay damages. Domenico v. Alaska
Packers' Assoc., II2 Fed. 554; Scanlon v. Northwood, I47 Mich. I39· A few
decisions are based on the theory that the forming of the new contract is a
rescission of the old one and that the liabilities under the latter are discharged. Evans v. Ore. & Wash. Ry. Co., 58 Wash. 429, 108 Pac. I095;
Coyner v. Lynde, IO Ind. 282. In Endriss v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 49 Mich. 279, it was
decided that the new agreement was independent of the old contract and
was regarded as an effort to mitigate the damages caused by the breach
of the latter. The principal case adopts the view that although there is
ordinarily no consideration for a promise of additional pay to induce performance, yet where there is a burden not contemplated by the parties cast
upon _the contractor there is a valid consideration for the promise. This
exception to the general rule is ordinarily followed in this country. Linz
v. Schuck, 100 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286; Michaud v. MacGregor, 6I Minn. 198;
King v. Dulttth etc. Ry Co., 6I Minn. 482; John King Co. v. Louisville &.
N. R. Co., I3l Ky. 46.
CoRPORA'.l'IONs-CoNs'.l'RUCTION oF '.!'HE TERMS "NET ANNUAL EARNINGS"
AND "SINKING FuNn."-X Railroad Company purchased canals of the state
which it turned over to X Canal Company in return for nearly all the stock
of the latter, which it continued to hold and by means of which it entirely
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controlled the Canal Company. On its organization X Canal Company issued bonds secured by a mortgage to which X Railroad Company became a
party by guaranteeing to purchase the coupons which should be defaulted by
X Canal Company. It was stipulated that X Canal Company should annually set aside for a sinking fund $20,000 of its net earnings, or all its
net earnings if less than that amount. X Canal Company failed to earn
$20,000 annually, and in estimating "net earnings" interest payments on the
bonds were subtracted from the gross earnings as part of the current expenses. Also part of the amount set aside for the sinking fund was devoted to purchasing and cancelling outstanding bonds. Held, that X Canal
Company improperly diverted money from the sinking fund to pay interest
on the bonds, in order to protect the X Railroad ·Company on its contingent
liability for the interest; that bonds bought up by the X Canal Company
should not have been cancelled but held in trust with accrued interest for
the sinking fund; and that X Railroad Company, which had benefitted pro
tanto by these transactions and which was in control of X Canal Company,
was liable to the bondholders. Pemzsylvania Canal Co. v. Brown (C. C. A.
1916), 235 Fed. 669.
In Mobile, &c. Ry. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, net earnings are said
to be "what is left after defraying every expense, including loans falling
due, as well as interest on such loans." bi Re London & General Bank
(18g4), 72 L. T. R. 227, 229, defines net earnings as the "excess of the current gains over the working expenses as shown l;>y the revenue accounts a!
distinguished from capital accounts." As is seen upon close examination, these
expressions really mean very little without an exhaustive investigation into
problems of accounting and business management in the light of the particular circumstances of each particular case. In regard to the particular
question raised in the instant case, U11io11 Pacific Ry Co. v. United States,
99 U. S. 402, cited in the instant case, seems directly in point. It is there
stated that net earnings are gross earnings minus "ordinary expenses of
organization and operation" and bona fide improvements which are "paid
out of earnings" and not by the issue of bonds or stocks. But interest
paid upon any of the bonded debt of the company is not to be deducted from
the gross earnings, as it shoulcJ be charged to the "capital interest account"
and not to "current expenditures." It is really a form of dividend on the
capital used in construction and "has nothing to do with, and cannot affect
the amount of the net earnings of the road." This is the view which is
adopted by the court in the instant case, but it is carefully confined to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. In New York there have been several
interesting decisions as to whether expenditures toward the retirement of
bonds are toward a sinking fund. Thus it was held, where the agreement was
to pay 1% of the principal and 7% interest annually to the mortgagee whereupon latter was to cancel an equivalent amount of outstanding bonds to be
selected by lot, that these expenditures were toward a sinking fund. M. K.
& T. Ry. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 443. And where the annual percentage appropriated is to go to trustees to be invested or to retire
bonds at discretion, such appropriations are toward a sinking fund. Coltlm-
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bia Gas & Electric Co. v. K11ickerbocker Trust Co., 136 N. Y. Supp. 84.o.
But where there were to be direct appropriations to retire specific numbers
of bonds annually, the ones retired to be selected by lot, this was held not
to be a sinking fund in Weinman v. Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Co., 140'
N. Y. Supp. 1085. The distinction drawn is observed in the instant case.
CoRPORATIONs-CoRPORATION BouND BY CoN'tRAC'l' MADE BY SHAREHOLDtt
CoNTROLI.ING !Ts 0PERATIONS.-Where the plaintiff SUl!d for an increase in
his salary as general manager from $40 a week to $6o a week, held that
whether this increase had been made by the two shareholders controlling
substantially all the stock and controlling the operation of the corporation,
and whether they had authority to bind the corporation, was a matter for the
jury. Harrison v. Repetti (1916), 16o N. Y. Supp. 1018.
A contract made with those who later acquired all the stock and constituted
four of fhe five directors of the corporation held to bind the: corporation and'
to entitle the plaintiff to an equitable account. Beltz v. Garrison (Pa. 1916),
g8 Atl. 955.
The well-established doctrine is that the shareholder of a corporation,
whether he hold one share or all the shares, has no authority to bind'
the corporation to any contract he may make in its behalf merely by
reason of his interest in the company. Some of the many cases along
this line are: Shankland v. Crane Oxygen Works & Ambulance Co.,
Inc., 151 N. Y. Supp. 899, employment contract; World's Panama· Exposition Co. v. American Brewing Ca., 134 La. 921, 64 So. 832, all stockholders except two; Eichelberger v. Mann, II5 Va. 774, 8o S. E. 595; Reed v.
Inhabitants of Trenton (N. J. Eq. 1912), 85 Atl. 270, sole shareholder; Purita11 Coal Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 237 Pa. 420, 85 Atl. 426, in
which all the shareholders united in the contract; McAveigh v. Pelham Park
Ry. Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 102; Collins v. Leary, 74 N. J. Eq. 852, 77 N. J. Eq.
529, 71 Atl. 6o3, 74 Atl. 42, principal shareholder; M cClaskey v. Goldman,
II5 N. Y. Supp. 189, principal shareholders; Lawson v. Black Diamond Coal
Co., 44 Wash. 26, 86 Pac. n20, shareholder in absolute control; Breathitt
Coal, Iron & Lumber Co. v. Gregory, 25 Ky.• L. Rep. 1507, 78 S. W. 148, employment; Jones v. Williams, 139-Mo. 1, 39 S. W. 486, majority shareholder.
But a heterodox doctrine based on the principles of implied agency, and inspired by the manifest injustice often accomplished by application of the
older rule, seems to be growing in favor and is exemplified in the instant
cases. The leading case of this line of decisions seems to be G. V. B. Min.
Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Hailey, 95 Fed. 23, in which it is stated that when
the business of a corporation'is conducted in an irregular manner, and contracts have thus been made with shareholders by one acting bona fide and
with knowledge of the corporation methods of doing ,business, the ordinary
rules, however well settled, as to powers of officers, etc., fail to apply, and
the corporation will be bound. One radical recent case, citing the above as
authority, holds that where two brothers owned all the shares of a corporation they were able to -bind the corporation to contracts made by them as
though they were partners, and 'Without any action of the board of directors,
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which the court said could be no more than "dummies." Carney v. Pe1111
Realty Co., 159 N. Y. Supp. 273. This is "looking beyond the corporate
form" with a vengeance! Other cases following the principles of G. V. B.
Min. Co. v. Bank are: MurPh'J' v. W. H. & F. W. Cane, Inc., 82 N. J. L.
557, 82 At!. 854, holding that when shareholders perform the acts normally
performed by directors, and in the regular course of business, their acts bind
the corporation; McElroy v. Mi1i11esota Percheron Horse Co., 96 Wis. 317,
71 N. W. 652, where the corporation was held bound by acts of its president
who controlled all but "dummy" stock and without authority exercised the
functions of the directors; Hatch v. Johnson Loan & Trust Co., 79 Fed.
828, where a note and mortgage, illegally executed by a shareholder, partly
for his own debt and partly for that of the corporation, was held to be an
equitable charge on the property of the corporation to the extent of the
corporation debt. Principles of agency, of equity, and of "natural justice"
are involved in these decisions which would seem to deserve careful analysis,
in 'order to determine their force, value and direction. Cf. CooK, CORPORATIONS, § § 709, 663, 664, and IO CYc. 760, 936, and: especially the note in 10
MICH.
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310.

CORPORATIONS-PROMISSORY NOTE AS CONSIDERATION FOR !SSUANCE OF
STOCK.-Stock in the defendant corporation had been issued to the plaintiff
in return for his note and trust deed to realty sufficient in value to fully secure the note. The plaintiff seeks the rescission of the contract as invalid
under the provision of the Texas Constitution that stock should be issued
only for "money paid, labor done, or prop'erty actually received." Held, that
the consideration failed to satisfy the provisions of the statute and that ,the
contract should be rescinded. Prudmtial Life Insurance Co. of Te.'l:as v.
Pearson (Tex. I9I6), 188 S. W. 5I3.
Under statutes and constitutional provisions similar to those in Texas it is
almost universally held that a note, even entirely unsecured, is "personal
property," and therefore a valid consideration for the issuance of stock.
Quartz Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Joyce, 27 Cal. App. 523, I50 Pac. 648; German
Mercantile Co. v. Wa1111er, 25 N. D. 479, 142 N. W. 463; First Nat'l Bank of
Ottumwa v. Fulton, 156 Iowa 734, I37 N. W. IOI9. But the Texas courts,
starting out with the proposition that a note is not "money" and that it is
not "property" but "mere evidence of indebtedness," have held (1) a mere
note fails to satisfy the statute, Commonwealth Bonding &c. Co. v. Hollifield (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), 184 S. W. 776; (2) a note secured by a pledge
of the stock fails to satisfy the statute, Republic Trnst Co. v. Taylor, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916), I84 S. W. 772; Kanaman v. Gahagan (Tex. Civ. App. 1916),
185 S. W. 619; (3) a note secured by solvent indorsers and a pledge of the
stock fails to satisfy the statute, McCarthy v. Texas Loan and Guaranty Co.
(Tex. Civ. App. l9II), 142 S. W. g6; (4) a note secured by a mortgage or
deed of trust fails to satisfy the statute, as held in the principal case and in
Commonwealth Bonding &c. Co. v. Hill, supra. In the last named case, however, the stock was retained in the possession and control of the corporation until the note should be paid and the court therefore held that it
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had never been "issued" and upheld the transaction on that ground. The
same is true of Cattlemen's Trust Co. v. Pruett (Tex. I916), I84 S. W. 7I6.
In the McCarty case, which seems to be the leading Texas case on the subject, cases in three states are cited to support the court's construction of
the statute. But it is submitted that none of these cases supports the proposition for which they are cited. Thus Jefferson v. Hewitt, 103 Cal. 624, 37 Pac.
638, decides that a note payable upon condition does not satisfy the statute,
while later California cases (see Quartz Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Joyce, supra)
are clearly opposed to the Texas construction. The Pennsylvania cases,
Leighty v. Tumpike Co., I4 Serg. & R. 434, and Boyd v. Peach Bottom Ry.
Co., 90 Pa. St. I6g, are both under statutes requiring a minimum cash payment on each share of stock issued. The opinion in Williams v. Brewster,
II7 Wis. 370, is cited at some length by the Te..'\:as court, and superficially
would seem to support its position, but the case itself merely decides that
stock issued for a note not yet due is not "paid in."
CRIMINAL LAW-VARIANCE IN CHARGE oF AssAULT AND BATTERY.-Under
an indictment charging defendant, a convict-guard, with assault and battery with a club, the proof showed that the assault was committed with a
strap. Held, that, as the defendant was not misled as to the subject of
prosecution, this was not a fatal variance. State v. Mincher (N. C. I9I6),
90 S. E. 429.
An indictment for assault and battery which charges that accused made
the assault on a named person and did unlawfully beat him, is sufficiently
specific, though it does not allege •what acts constituted the assault, nor in
what manner the beating was done. Sims v. State, n8 Ga. 76!, 45 S. E. 62I;
State v. Cla3•ton, 100 Mo. 5I6, 13 S. W. 8I9, I8 Am. St. Rep. 565; State v.
Finley, 6 Kan. 366. Conceding that such allegation of the means used is
unnecessary, what is the effect of so alleging that fact? Is it mere surplusage
which does not vitiate the indictment otherwise sufficient, and as such need
not be proved, or is it a part of a material allegation of that descriptive nature
which requires exact proof? The general rule is stated thus,.::.__"When a
material allegation is made unnecessarily precise by a too particular description, the descriptive averment cannot be separated and rejected but must be
proven as laid. Whether an unnecessary allegation may be rejected as
surplusage, or must be proved as laid, is not always easy to determine. The
reason for insisting on proof of the description is that otherwise the defendant would be misled to his harm; though the same reason would in
many cases require proof of the allegations rejected under the rule of
surplusage." BEALE, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § II2. Whether the
doctrine of notice be the real foundation for requiring propf of the facts
alleged, or not, courts have not been agreed in their application of the rule.
In accordance with the above rule, it has been held that where the state
elected to try the accused for an assault comrr.itted on a particular date in
a particular manner, it must prove that the assault was committed on that
date by the means alleged. Graham v. State, 72 Tex. Crim. App. 9, I6o S.
W. 7I4. Also, under an indictment charging assault with a knife, such
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means of assault must be proved. II ext v. State, ~ Tex. Crim. 576, 90 S. W.
43; Wilson v. State, 7 Ala. App. 66, 6o So. g83. Similarly, mere descriptive
epithets cannot be rejected as surplusage, ever if they are introduced by a
videlicet. Walker v. State, 73 Ala. 17; Commollwealth v. McCarthy, 145
Mass. 575, 14 N. E. 643. In Walker v. State, under an indictment fur
assault "with a weapon, to-wit, a gun," proof of assault .with the hand or
first only, shows a fatal variance. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. McCarthy,
an allegation in an indictment that the defendant "wilfully did throw a certain missile, to-wit, a stone" was not sustained by proof that he threw only
a billet of wood. Variances were held to be fatal in the following cases,allegation of assault with axe, proof of assault with shovel, Ferg11son v.
State, 4 Tex. App. 156; allegation of assault with bois d'arc stick, proof of
assault with picket, McGrew v. State, 19 Tex. App. 302; allegation of assault with knife, proof of assault with stick, Herald v. State, 37 Tex. Crim.
409, 35 S. W. 670; allegation of assault with bottle, proof of assault with
glass, Jo11es v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1901), 62 S. W. 758. On the other
hand, under an indictment charging assault "with a deadly weapon, to-wit,
a club," it was held that proof of the injuries received, without specification
of the means used, sustained the indictment. State v. Phillips, 104 N. C. 786,
IO S. E. 463. And variances were held not to be fatal in the following
cases, viz: allegation of assault with razor, proof of assault with pocketknife, Hall v. State, 79 Ala. 34; allegation of assault with fist, proof of assault with hand, Allen v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. App. 436, 37 S. W. 738; allegation of striking with gun, proof of beating with stone, Ryan v. State, 52
Ind. 167. With the possible exception of the case last cited, the principal
case goes further than any preceding case in holding that the variance is
not fatal. In applying the doctrine of notice to the facts under consideration, the North Carolina· court undoubtedly arrived at a commendable decision. A variance should not be fatal unless it appears to have resulted in
unfair surprise. If, by reason of the descriptive allegations, the defendant
had prepared to try one transaction, and the state then sought to try another,
that •would be such a case. If, on the other hand, the defendant has prepared to try the very transaction evidenced by the state, the fact that the
defendant may have hoped to succeed by disproof of an immaterial allegation, should be considered irrelevant.
DAMAGES-ExEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST CORPORATION FOR TORT OF SERVANT.-ln an action for damages for an assault and battery committed on the
plaintiff by the servants and employees of the defendant corporation, Held,
exemplary damages may be allowed against the corporation. Indianapolis
Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, (Ind. App. 1916), n3 N. E. 1019.
The two propositions involved in this case, (1) as to whether exemplary
damages may be recovered for an act that may be punishable as a crime,
and (2) as to whether a corporation can be held liable in exemplary damages
for the act of its servant, are questions about which there is great contrariety and confusion in the authorities. In the principal case the rule is
laid down that examplary damages cannot be assessed in case of a wrong
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the commission of which subjects the wrongdoer both to a criminal prosecution and a civil action. Cases in accord, are: lv!urphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 54I,
5 Pac. II9, 49 Am. Rep. 366; Hieber v. Teuber, 3 MacArthur 484, 36 Am.
Rep. no; Albrecht v. Walker, 73 Ill. 69; Wabash Printing &c. Co. v. Crumrine, I23 Ind. 8g, 2I N. E. 904; A11stion v. i;Vilson, 4 Cush, 273, 50 Am. Dec.
766; Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68, 30 Am. Rep. 8I4; Fay v. Parker, 53· N. H.
342, I6 Am. Rep. 270. Contra, Brown v. Evans, I7 Fed. 9I2; Wilson v.
Middleton, 2 Cal. 54; Brannon v. Silvermail, 81 Ill. 434; Haieser v. Griffith~
102 Iowa 2I5, 7J. N. W. 223; lockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109, 44 Am. Rep.
625; Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 7 N. W. 263, 38 Am. Rep. 295; Barr
V. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385, 30 Am. Rep. 367; Cole v. {fucker, 6 Tex. 266; Edwards v. Leavitt, 46 Vt. 126; Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 7 Cent. Law
J. 2o8. But, argued the court in the principal case, the corporation is not
exposed to a criminal prosecution, therefore exemplary damages may be allowed against a corporation for the assault of its agent, though the assault exposed the agent to a criminal prosecution. Among the cases in support of this doctrine there are, L. N. A. & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Wolfe, I28
Ind. 347, 27 N. E. 606, 25 Am. St. Rep. 436; Goddard v. Grand Tnmk Ry Co.,
57 Me. 202, 2 Am. Rep. 309; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt, 86 Ill. 455, 29
Am. Rep. 43; Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Pittsburg &c. Ry Co. v. Slusser, I9 Ohio St. I57· The rule has been unusually
stringent against common carriers and especially railroad companies. Lienka11f v. Morris, 66 Ala. 4o6; Goddard v. Grand Tr1111k Ry. Co., supra. However some of the strongest cases are contra, Warner v. So11thern Pac. Co.,
n3 Cal. 105, 45 Pac. 187, 54 Am. St Rep. 327; Hagan v. Providence &
Worcester R.R., 3 RI. 88, 9I; L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, I47 U. S.
IOI, I3 Sup. Ct. 26I. For a comment on the case last cited and a sound
criticism of the doctrine of allowing exemplary damages against corporations for the torts of their agents or servants see 7 HARV. L. lbw. 45. But
even these cases agree that puritive damages may be allowed against the
principal if "the principal participated in the wrongful act of the agent, expressly or impliedly, by his conduct authorizing it or approving it, either
before or after it was committed." See generally, 13 Cvc. n4-n8, l Sr:ncWICK, DAMAGr:s· (8th Ed.) § 38o.
Dr:'rr:RMINABLE F:i;;r:s-CoNSTRUCTION oF WILLS.-A testator, 82 years old·
when he made his will, and leaving, when he died, his wife, three daughters,
and an unmarried son, devised the life income from his estate to his wife,
to his son the remainder of his estate, after paying certain legacies to his
daughters. The will provided that "in the event that any of my children
should die without definite issue and ·before this will takes effect, then their
respective share or'shares * * * shall accrue to my surviving children, share
and share alike." The son survived the testator, married, and died without
issue (his wife surviving him) in the lifetime of his mother. Held, the son
took only a base or determinable fee, and on ·his death without issue his
share went to his surviving sisters. Abrahams v. Sanders (Ill. l9I6), II3'
N. E. 737.
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Some modern writers on real property are of the opinion that determinable
"fees could not be created since the statute of Quia Emptores, passed in I290,
"because that statute destroyed, in all conveyences of fee simple, the tenure
·upon which the possibility of reverter depended. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2nd Ed.), § 31-<t2a; 3 LAW QuART. REv. 399;SANDERS, UsEs
.AND TRUSTS (5th Ed.), 208-209; LEAKE, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
IN LAND (2nd Ed.), 25. At least one modern writer is of the opposite
opinion, and defends his position on the theory ·that Quia Emptores applied
solely to conveyences in fee simple absolute. CHALLIS, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 403. Many cases recognize determinable fees. First Universalist So·Ciety of North Adams v. Boland, I55 Mass. I7I (in which case, according
10 GRAY, this point need not have been decided) ; Stuart v. Easton, I70 U.
S. 383, 42 Law, Ed. 1078; Siegel v. Lauer, I48 Pa. St. 236; P11lse v. Osborn,
30 Ind. App. 63I, 64 N. E. 59; Wheeler v. Long, I28 Ia. 643, 105 N. W. I6I;
Commonwealth v. Pollitt, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 790, 76 S. W. 4I2. See 2 SHARSwoon AND Bunn, LEADING CASES IN AMERICAN LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, I7
et seq. The instant case is one in which the court so construed the will as
to give the son but a fee simple determinable, even though certainly without any great effort, it might so have construed it as to create in him a fee
simple. Probably the motive behind the court's action is commendable and
the result meritorious, for such an interpretation, in the light of what has
happened since the testator's death, achieves the result which the testator
doubtless would have desired. So the case may be taken as illustrating
the effort a court will make to effectuate the so-called intent of the testator.
Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N. H. 434; 9 CoL. LAW REv. SI; 9 HARV. LAW REV. 242.
DIVORCE-MATRIMONIAL DoMICIL.-The husband deserted the wife in Massachusetts, where they had lived since marriage; he moved to Georgia,
established his domicil there, and secured a divorce there on the ground
of cruel and abusive treatment, of which suit the wife had no actual notice.
Later she brought this suit for divorce in Massachusetts. Held, that since
the husband deserted the wife unjustifiably, the matrimonial domicil remained in Massachusetts, and she having no actual notice of the suit for ·
.divorce in Georgia, that decree would not be recognized under the rules
of interstate comity nor did the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution apply, and she was entitled to a divorce. Perkins v. Perkins, (Mass.
I9I6), II3 N. E. 84I.
The principal case seems to present practically the same facts as Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, and reaches the same conclusions in spite
of the great amount of criticism which has been directed against Haddock v. Haddock. See 4 MICH. L. REv. 534, u MICH. L. REV. 5o8, I9 HARV.
L. RE\', 586. It differs slightly from Haddock v. Haddock in the fact that
the husband and wife had lived together in Massachusetts some time before he deserted her, while in Haddock v. Haddock they never lived together in New York where the court found the matrimonial domicil to be.
So the principal case did not go so far as Haddock v. Haddock. The last
mentioned case decided that divorce given without actual notice by a court
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having no jurisdiction over the matrimonial domicil was not entitled to
full faith and credit in other states, but that other states might recognize
such decree under the principles of int~rstate comity. Toncray v. Toncray,
I23 Tenn. 476, and Howard v. Strode, 242 Mo. 210, reached an opposite
conclusion from Haddock v. Haddock on the ground of interstate comity,
but are squarely opposed to the principal case. In Joyner v. Joyner, I3I Ga.
217; Felt v. Felt, 59 N. J. Eq. 6o6, and Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn.
689, the opposite conclnsion was also reached on the ground of comity, but
in these cases the defendant had actual notice. In the principal case there
was no actual notice given and the court reserved the question as to its
effect had there been such notice. It was held in Atherton v. Atherton, I81
U. S. 155, that where the wife deserted the husband unjustifiably the decree of the court of Kentucky, the matrimonial domicil, having jurisdiction
over the injured husband and over the deserting wife whose domicil was
presumed to have continued in Kentud.'}' despite her desertion, would be entitled to full faith and credit. Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, decides the same. In North v. North, 93 N. Y. Supp, 5I2, the husband, being
deserted by the wife in New York, moved to California, established his
domicil there and obtained a divorce. It was held that the divorce was
entitled to full faith and credit in New York since the wife's domicil is
the same as that of the husband, and so the California court had jurisdiction over the matrimonial domicil and the injured party. The recent case
of Stevens v. Allm, (La. 1916), 7I So. 936, 15 MICH. L. Ri>v. 82, holds that
where the wife unjustifiably refuses to follow the husband the matrimonial
· domicil follows him, but the question as to whether a decree granted him
in the state of his domicil was entitled to full faith and credit was not involved. In Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 2I3, the husband deserted the wife
without justification. She moved to Illinois and established a domicil there
and sued for and obtained a divorce. It was held that this decree was entitled to recognition in Washington, where the husband was domiciled,
under the full faith and credit clause and under. the principle of comity.
The principal case differs from the cases just discussed following' Atherton
v. Atherton in the fact that the Massachusetts court finds that the Georgia
decree was wrongfully ohtained by the husband, who had been guilty of
desertion, while in the other cases there was no examination by the court
as to the facts passed on by the foreign court which granted the divorce fa
question.
EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION-IMPLIED GRANT OF EASEMENT.-The owner
of two adjoining lots, one back of the other, built a three-story building
which covered the front lot, and, together with the rear porch, extended
twenty feet upon the back lot. There was no way of entering the building
from the rear except through that portion of the building which was on
the back lot, and such means of entrance had long been used. The owner
of the lots mortgaged the front lot to defendant's predecessor in title, describing the lot by its number in the block, the number of the block, and by
the length of the lot. Later he conveyed the back lot to plaintiff, who
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sues to quiet his title to the twenty feet of the back Jot covered by the
building and porch. Held, that the mortgage to the defendant's predecessor
in title created by implication a permanent easement in favor of the front
lot, in so much of the back lot as is covered by the building and porch.
Lead City Miner's Union v. Moyer et al., 235 Fed. 376.
This case raises the question of the creation of an easement by implied
grant or conveyance of the quasi-dominant estate. This sort of case should
be always distinguished from that of the creation of an easement of implied reservation, because many courts have decided that only in a certain
few special classes of cases may easements be created by implied reservation. See 9 MICH. L. R:i;v. 709. If the question is, as here, ·Whether an
easement has been created by implied grant, there are several requisites.
(1) The easement must be apparent. Clilzak v. Klekr, II7 Ill. 643, 7 N. E.
III; Martin v. lfforphy, 221 Ill. 632, 77 N. E. u26; Kelly v. Dwmi11g, 43 N.
J. Eq. 62, IO At!. 276; Tooth v. Bryce, 50 N. J. Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182; Ja11es
v. Jenkins, 34 Md. I, 6 Am. Rep. 300; Evans v. Dana, 7 R. I. 306; Sanderlin
v. Baxter, 76 Va. 299, 44 Am. Rep. 165. An easement has been said to be
apparent when signs of it "must necessarily be seen" or "may be seen or
known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant with the
subject," Pyer v. Carter, 1 Hurl. & N. 916 (a case though of implied reservation). In a recent case an English court said that the signs need be
apparent on the dominant estate only. Schwa1m v. Cotton [1916], 2 Ch. 120,
affirmed, 85 L. J. Ch. 689. (2) Another requisite in some jurisdictions is
that the quasi-easement be continuous. fiVoodcock v. Baldwin, 51 La. Ann.
989; Folden v. Bastard, 4 Best & S. 258; Tooth v. Bryce, supra; Duvall
v. Ridout, 124 Md. 193, 92 At!. 209. Courts are not agreed on just what is
meant by continuous. Poldm v. Bastard held' that an easement of the right
to go onto the land of another after water was not continuous, and Tooth
v. Bryce that because the premises were permanently adapted to the use of
the easement the easement is. continuous, though in order to keep it repaired going onto the land of another was necessary. Some courts have
abandoned the requisite that the easement be continuous. Baker v. Rice,
56 Oh. St. 463, 4; N. E. 653, which makes requisite only that the easement
be apparent and reasonably necessary to the use of the premises granted.
Thomas v. Owen, 57 L. J. Q. B. 198, 202 (dicta); Bayley v. Great 1Vestem
Railway, 26 Cb. D. 434. It seems that continuity might well be dispensed
with, and be regarded when present as merely evidence of the permanence
or necessity of the easement. (3) Another requisite iS that the easement
be necessary. Manifestly what is meant is not that the easement be one of
such necessity as would create a way of necessity, for were it so necessary
that necessity alone would suffice, without any consideration as to whether
the easement was apparant or continuous. \Vhat probably is meant is that
the easement must be reasonably necessary for the continuance of that
use to which the property was being put when the conveyance was made.
Adams v. Gordan, 265 Ill. 87, 1o6 N. E. 517; Ellis v. Bassett, 128 Ind. u8,
25 Am. St. Rep. 421, 27 N. E. 344; Johson v. Gould, 60 W. Va. 84, 53
S. E. 798.
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FALs:e IMPRISONMtN'.l.'-Alm:esT WITHOUT WARRANT.-In an action for
false imprisonment for an arrest, by an officer without a warrant, for a violation of the Sunday Law (P. S. 5955-5957), the defendant attempted to justify
on the ground that his purpose in making the arrest was to prevent some
further work not permitted by the Sunday Law. Held, the officer cannot
justify the arrest on that ground. Mazzolini v. Gifford (Vt. 1916), g8 Atl.
904
At common law an arrest could not be made by an officer without a warrant, for a misdemeanor, unless the offense was being committed in his
presence. Bowditch v. Balchiti, 5 Exch. 378; Rex v. Bright, 4 C. & P. 387,
19 E. C. L. 434; Commonwealth v. Care·y, 12 Cush. 246; Quinn v. Husel, 40
Mich. 576; Phillips v. Trull, I I Johns. (N. Y.) 486. Nor can he arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor though committed in his presence which
does not amount to a breach of the peace. Butolph v. Blllst, 5 Lans. (N. Y.)
84; Com111011wealth v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149. However, the rule has been
changed in many jurisd.ictions by statute. In Mayo v. Wilson, I N. H. 53,
a statute authorizing selectmen to arrest, without a warrant, persons suspected of travelling unnecessarily on the Lord's Day, was held to be constitutional. An arrest without a warrant, for an alleged breach of the Sunday Law was declared to be illegal in Commonwealth v. Collins (Pa.
Quart. Sess.), 12 Rep. 284. But the decision in the principal case goes
to the extent of saying that, though the purpose in the arrest is to prevent further work, and thus prevent the continuing of an act which is
criminal according to the statute, nevertheless an officer would not be justified
in arresting the offender without a warrant. In State v. McNally, 87 Mo.
644 the court used the following language: "A peace officer has the right
to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor where the arrest is made
flagrante delicto, and he is possessed of the same powers in making such
arrest, and is authorized to employ the same force, and to resort where
necessary, to the same extreme measures in overcoming resistance as in the
case of a· felony." This statement would seem to be too broad, in view
of the above cases, unless the officer had been given some such aut~ority by
statute.
INJUNCTION-AGAINST CoNSTRUCTION OF PuBI,Ic WoRK B:eFoRt RIGHT oF
E11nNtNT DOMAIN rs ExF.RCISED.-The defendant city comm~nced the construction of a sewer across the plaintiff's land before it had obtained a right
of way. The plaintiff seeks an injunction restraining the defendant from
collecting the improvement assessment on his property and to require the
removal of the sewer from his premises. Held, that both forms of relief
should be granted, unless the defendant, within a reasonable time, should
acquire a right of way. Fraser v. Portland (Ore. 1916), 158 Pac. 514
It is well settled that a court of equity will enjoin the taking of private
property until the right to make an entry is obtained in accordance with
the condemnation statutes. Mobile Ry. Co. v. Ala. Midland R·y. Co., 123
Ala. 145, 26 So. 324; Hardensburg v. Cravens, 148 Ind. I, 47 N. E. 153;
Hughes v. Milligaa, 42 Kan. 396, 22 Pac. 313. This is for the reason that
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the remedy at law is inadequate; efficient justice demands that the constitutional rights of landowners be preserved. It is no doubt just to hold
that if a corporation has the right to secure a right of way in a legal and
peaceful manner, it should be obliged to pursue that method rather than
the indirect and disorderly method of committing a tort and forcing the
land owner to bring an action at law for damages. There are a few cases,
however, which hold that relief will be denied on the ground that the legal
relief is adequate. Smith v. Weldon, 73 Ind. 454; Anderson v. St. Louis,
47 Mo. 479; McLaughlin v. Sandusky, 17 Neb. no. Also it is quite generally held that in cases where there is a mere technical irregularity in the
obtaining of the right of way, an injunction will be refused. Keigwin v.
Drainage Coms., II5 Ill. 347; Appeal of Patterson, 129 Pa. St. 109, 17 Atl.
563. But the principal case is well supported both on principle and· authority.
The . decree in the principal case is put in the proper and sensible form,
i. e., injunction to be effective only until the right of way is obtained.
An order perpetually restraining the city from opening the sewer .would
be erroneous. Chicago v. Wright, 69 Ill. 318; Champion v. Sessions, 2 Nev.
271 (reprint 781).
INJUNCTION-AGAINS'l' Lma.-Plaintiff was the exclusive distributing agent
of a certain proprietary medicine in six southern states. He brought a bill
for an injunction to restrain the defendant from continuing to publish in his
newspaper malicious and libelous matter reflecting on the plaintiff and injuring his business. Held, that this injunction should be refused. Willis v.
O'Connell (D. C. 1916), 231 Fed. 1004.
·
Most of the authorities agree that equity will not ordinarily re5train publication of a libel even if the property rights of the plaintiff are injured.
Flint v. Hi1tchinson Smoke Burner Co., no Mo. 492, 19 S. W. 8o4 16 L. R.
A. 243, 33 Am. St. Rep. 476; A111erica1i Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed. 351,
126 C. C. A. 277; PoM:EROY, EQUITY }URISPRUDENC!l (1906), Vol. 6, -§ 629;
2 HIGH, INJUNCTIONS (4th Ed.), g68. The reason commonly assigned for
this view is that the granting of an injunction would interfere with the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press and the policy
of the law as to trial by jury in cases of libel and slander. However, there
are a number of Federal cases which hold that if the defendant is intimidating the plaintiff or his customers by the use of libelous matter, an injunction
will be granted. Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Unioti (C. C.), 45 Fed.
135, 12 L. R. A. 193; Emach v. Kane, 34 Fed. 45; Atlas Underwear Co. v,
Cooper Underwear· Co., 210 Fed. 347. Of such cases the court in American
Malting Co. v. Keitel, supra, says: "It is true that where proper grounds
exist for assuming jurisdiction, equity does not refuse an injunction because there is incidentally involved the restraining of a libel." This dictum,
in effect, admits that equity does not violate the constitutional guaranties in
granting an injunction against a libel. It would seem then that, upon
principle, equity should restrain the publication of a libel, when the remedy
at law is inadequate, as it is where the plaintiff's business or reputation is

274

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

injured. This, of course, presupposes that the publication is admittedly
wrongful or clearly shown to be so. For a discussion favoring the restraining of libel see 29 HARv. L. Rtv. 640.
MAST!lR AND Si;:RvANT-Acc!lPTANCE oF \VoRKM!lN's CoMP!lNSATION ACT
AS TO FARM LABORllR.-Defendant was a corporation manufacturing drugs,
semms, etc., its chief office and factory being in Detroit. It maintains,
however, a farm near Detroit, on which are kept many horses for serum
production, which is the chief purpose of the farm. Some of the grain raised
on the farm, however, is sold. Plaintiff was employed generally on the
farm, and was injured while caring for the horses, and sues to recover
against the defendant under the WoRKM!lN's CoMP!lNSATION ACT, (Act IO
of the Special Session of 19r2). The defendant corporation had accepted
the provisions of the act by a statement in general terms, neither expressly
including nor excluding any particular class of employes. It had also posted
notices of its acceptance in its laboratories, offices, etc., in Detroit, but not
on the farm on which plaintiff was injured. Held, defendant is not liable
under said act. Shafe•· v. Parke Davis & Co., (Mich. r9r6), rs9 N. W. 304
On the question of whether or not the plaintiff was within the class referred to by the statute as a farm laborer, it was the opinion of the Industrial Accident Board that the company should not be classed as a farmer,
inasmuch as its use of the farm was but incidental to its principal occupation as a manufacturer, and that the claimant, consequently, was not a farm
laborer. In reversing this, the supreme court said: "The statute does not
classify the employee by the ordinary business of his employer, but by the
kind of work he, himself, is employed to do. And any attempt to classify
the employee through a consideration of the uses for which the product
of the farm is designed would lead to endless confusion." On the question
of whether or not the defendant had accepted the Act, the court held that
although employers of farm laborers are exempt from the coercive effects
of the Act, still they are not barred from electing to come under it (OsTRAND!lR,.J., dissenting). But as they are exempt from the coercive effect,
they can still retain their common law defenses in actions against them
by farm laborers, and consequently the court held that it could not assume an acceptance, which would be a waiver of its common law defenses,
unless the same appeared clearly and specifically-that the general acceptance, and the posting of notices in the offices in Detroit, was not sufficient
from which to construe acceptance as to the farm outside. Therefore, not
having accepted the Act as to the farm, the defendant is not liable to this
plaintiff under the Act.
P.<\RllNT AND CHILD-LIABII.ITY OF PARENT FOR NllC!lSSARI!lS.-The defendant had moved from Chattanooga into an adjoining county, leaving
his two minor daughters to take care of themselves, which they did without assistance from him. The younger, a girl of seventeen years, became
ill and the plaintiff, a physician, was called in. The defendant was informed
by the older daughter that a slight operation was necessary and he assented. The plaintiff did not know of the defendant's assent until after the
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operation. The operation was, in fact, more serious than the daughter had
told the defendant. Ifeld, that there had been no complete emancipation
of the daughter and the law would imply a promise on the part of the defendant to pay for the operation. Wallace Y. Co.1·, (1916 Tenn.), 188 S.
\V. 6II.
The English courts and many in this country hold that the father is
under only a moral obligation to provide necessaries for his children, unless
he expressly or impliedly promises to pay for the necessaries furnished by
others. Keiley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348; Dmnser
v. Underwood, 68 Ill. App. 121. Most of the later cases in this country hold
that there is a legal obligation. Porter v. Powell, 79 Ia. 151; Pret::inger v.
Pretzinger, 45 Oh. St. 452. The principal case so holds. A promise to pay
will, however, he implied upon slight grounds under the rule first mentioned. \\There a minor son had work done by a dentist without his father's consent it was held that the fact that the father did not reply to the
dentist's bills would be evidence to go to the jury as to whether he had
authorized the work to be done. Lamson v. Varm1m, 171 1vlass. 237. Where
the child has left home with his parent's consent, and is allowed to keep
his wages as in the principal case, it is held that there is an implied emancipation, at least so far as to allow the child to recover in a suit for his
wages. Vance v. Calhoun, 77 Ark. 35; Biggs v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co., 91
Ark. 12.2; Chase v. Elkins, 2 Vt. 290. In the principal case and in Porter
v. Powell, supra, it is held to be only a partial emancipation, and it is so
in that the father may revoke the implied emancipation at any time, provided he does not interfere with the vested rights of third persons. Stovall
v. Johnso11, 17 Ala. 14; Abbot v. Converse, 4 Allen (Mass.) 530. In Rounds
Bros. v. M cDa11iel, 133 Ky. 669, it was held that the father could not revoke his minor son's implied emancipation as it would be extremely detrimental to the son's interests to do so. If the fact of the child's emancipation makes any difference as to the father's liability for necessaries furnished him, it would seem to follow in cases like the one last mentioned
that where the father could no longer secure the value of the son's services
he .should not be under any legal obligation to support the son. The principal case holds that a promise to pay on the part of the father will be
implied by law under the circumstances above, at least under the .rule that the
father is under a legal obligation to support his children.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-WHEN BARRED BY LACHES.-In 1900 plaintiff leased
its power plant for 99 years, the lessee covenanting to maintain and preserve
the general efficiency of the plant during the continuance of the lease. Violations of this covenant occurred shortly thereafter. Suit for specific performance was not brought till 1912. Held, the suit was not barred by !aches,
since there was a long-drawn-out dispute between the parties as to the performance of the covenants. Edison Illitmillating Co. v. Eastern Pe1111SJ•lva11i;z
Power Co. (Pa. 1916), g8 At!. 652.
This case well illustrates the doctrine that mere lapse of time unconnected
with circumstances which would make it inequitable to grant specific per-
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formance will not necessarily be deemed !aches. Had the plaintiff acquiesced,
in the defendants' non-performance, instead of disputing with defendant
from time to time concerning this non-performance, plaintiff's acquiescence
might have barred his suit. Scott v. Desire, I75 Ill. App. 2I5; Hopkins v.
Lewis, I8 Cal. App. 107, 122 Pac. 433. Or had there been any showing that
drcumstances had so changed in the twelve years as to make the defendant's
obligation to perform more burdensome, the plaintiff's remedy would prob:ably have been denied him. Whitney v. Cheshire l?. Co., 210 Mass. 263, 96
N. E. 676; Groesbeck v. Morgan, 2o6 N. Y. 385, 99 N". E. Io46; Marsh \'.
Lott, 156 Cal. 643, 105 Pac. 968. Or had defendant, in the meantime, altered
bis position, Taft v. Henry, 219 Mass. 78, 106 N. E. 553; or had third parties
acquired intervening rights which would he injured by a decree in plaintiff's
favor, plaintiff's delay would have been fatal. Par!{side Realty Co. v. iVIacDo11ald, I66 Cal. 426, I37 Pac. 2I. On the other hand, there are circumstances
which .;ould have made plaintiff's position stronger than it was. For instance, had he just learned that the contract had not been performed his
chances for a decree would have been bettered, Stonehouse v. Sto11el10usc,
I56 Mich. 43, I2o N. W. 23, I6 Det. Leg. N. 21; Agens v. Koch, 74 N. J. Eq.
528, 70 Atl. 348. So also had the delay been caused by the defendant, Fletcher
v. Hlireman, I52 Ky. 565, IS8 S. W. 982; Nobles v. L'E11gle, 58 Fla. 48o, 494,
51 So. 405, 409; or had the contract been one for the sale of land and had the
plaintiff, the vendee, been in possession, Snell v. Hill, 263 Ill. 2n, 105 N. E.
I6; Shorett v. K1111dso11, 74 Wash. 448. 133 Pac. 1029; .~faster v. Roberts, 2~4
Pa. 342, go Atl. 735; Wright v. Brook:-, 47 Mont. 99, 130 Pac. 968; lllills v.
McLanahan, 70 W. Va. 288, 73 S. E. 927; Van DJ,•l{e v. Cole, 81 Vt. 379, 70
Atl. 593. This last statement only holds where the possession of the plaintiff, the vendee, was under anct not adverse to the contract. Clinchfield Coal
Co. v. Clintwood Coal & Timber C(I._. 108 Va. 433, 62 S. E. 329. One case at
least has held that the burden is on the plaintiff to explain his delay and that
a delay of three years, unexplained, is a bar to the suit. Sharp v. West, 150
Fed. 458. On the general subject of laches as a bar to a suit for the specific
performance of a contract see POMEROY, CoNTRACTs, § 370 ff.
TRUSTS-APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO TRUSTS ARISING BY
OPERATION OF LAW.-In an action to quiet title to certain land, the defendant
claimed an equitable title to the same, based on a constructive trust. To
this claim the plaintiff set up the Statute of Limitations. Held, that the
statute is applfcable to constructive trusts and that the defendant's claim is
barred. Terry v. Davenport (Ind. 19I6), II2 N. E. 998.
It is a universal principle that the Statute of Limitations does not operate
between the trustee and the cestui que trust of an express trust unless there
is an express repudiation by the trustee. Hatt v. Green, I8o Mich. 383, 147
N. W. 593; Cruse v. Kidd (Ala. 1915),_ 70 So. 166; 3 Woon, LIMITATIONS,
504. However, it is generally held that constructive trusts are subject to
the operation of the statute. Stubbins v. Briggs, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 230, 68 S. W.
392; King v. Pardee, g6 U. S. go, 2 Woon, LIMITATIONS, 5o8. This would
seem reasonable, as a constructive trust is a mere remedial device and there
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is a concurrent remedy at law. By analogy, if the right to bring a legal
action for fraud is barred, the right to enforce a trust should also be
barred. There are some cases which hold, on the other hand, that theStatute of Limitations is not applicable to trusts arising by operation of law,
i. e., constructive trusts. Ackley v. Croucher, 203 Ill. 530, 68 N. W. 86;
Canada v. Daniel, 175 Mo. App. 55, 157 S. W. 1032; but these cases are inthe minority.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-ESTOPPI:J, BY PL-\T.-Lands were laid out in accordance with a plat, with reference to which the plaintiff and defendant
purchased. Their respective purchases were located on the opposite sides of
a platted street, and abutted on it. Before defendant purchased, plaintiff had
fenced in that part of the street now in controversy, and has maintained his
fence for more than five years. A statute provides that any street unopened
to the public for five years after authority to open same is thereby vacated;
and plaintiff, relying on this statute, sues to quiet title to the part of the
street fenced by him. Held, defendant gained an easement in the platted
street by the principle of estoppel which operated to defeat any right of
plaintiff, who held under the original grantor, and that the rights of defendant were in no way affected by the statute which had operated to extinguish the rights of the public .. Vtm Burm v. Trumbull (Wash. 1916), 159.
Pac. 891.
That the defendant, as here laid down, acquired an easement in the street
by an estoppel which would operate a~ainst the grantor, and all holding under him, is well settled. fo Re City of New York, 82 N. Y. Supp. •ir7;
Matter of Mayor, 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 513; Sipe v. Alley, II7 Va. 819, 86
S. E. 122; Gibson v. Gross, 142 Ga. 104, &i S. E. 373; Rupprecht v. St. Mary's
ChttrchSociety, II5 N. Y. Supp. 926, affirmed 198 N. Y. 576; Poorev.Greer,2z·
Del. 220, 65 At!. 767; Franklin I11s. Co. v. Cousens, 127 Mass. 258; Dill v.
Board of Education, 47 N. J. Eq. 421; as is also the principle that this private
easement is unaffected by the termination of the public right, however caused,
Hoskins v. Wathm Bro. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 814, 47 S. W. 595; Douthitt v..
Canaday, Gilliun <<;- Kes, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2159, 73 S. W. 757; Carrol v. Asbury, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 354; Shelter \'. Wetzel, 242 Pa. 355, 89 At!. 455;
Swedish Church v. Jackson, 229 Ill. 506, 82 N. E. 348. The plaintiff claimed·
to have acquired a title by operation of the Statute of Limitations. It would
appear from the report that the possession was exclusive, but it is not apparent when it was begun. It is difficult to find any color of right in the·
plaintiff except that relied upon, but the conclusion reached by the court is
based upon the doctrine of estoppel, which, of course, would be no answer
to one claiming an original title, acquired by adverse user for the statutory
period.
WILr.s-Comcrr, As Re-PuBI,ICATION oF PRov1s10N CANCEi.I.ING DtBTs.-011'
exceptions to final account of executors for not including in the assets $32,000.00 loaned one of them in 1910 and secured by mortgage, it was contended
that the debt was cancelled by the words "any indebtedness to me is hereby-
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cancelled" contained in the will made in 19o6, because of the codicil of 19u,
stating "I have read over and resealed this will each summer before leaving
home, and now wish to make the following changes," but not referring to
the clause first above quoted. Held, that the will and codicils manifested
no intent to cancel the mortgage debt, and that the executors were liable
therefor. Edwards' Estate, (Pa. 1916), 98 Atl. 879.
The court recognizes the accepted rule that the codicil makes the will
speak from the date of the codicil, but puts its decision on the qualification
(quoting ]ARMAN, Wn.r.s (6th Eng. Ed. 1910) 203), that "Although it is true
that a codicil confirming a will makes the will for many purposes to bear
the date of the codicil, yet this rule is subject to the limitation that the intention of the testator be not defeated thereby. If, therefore, the testator, in
making his will, obviously means its provisions to apply to a state of circumstances existing at its date, republication will not make its provisions apply
to the sfate of circumstances existing at the date of the codicil." 'The court
also relies on Alsop's Appeal, 9 Pa. 384. The cases on the exact point involved in the principal case are not numerous, only the following have been
found: Smith v. Coale, 4 Pa. 376, where a son-in-law contended that a loan
to him was cancelled by the republication of a will which contained the provision, "I give to my daughter, E, the wife of J. S., exclusive of what I advanced her and her husband, and of the money her husband has since received from me, $3,325.00, to be paid her one year after my decease." Although the codicil related to another subject, the court held the debt cancelled, saying, "the legal operation of the codicil to republish the will, can
only be negatived by the contents of the codicil itself showing by internal
evidence, not that such an intention had no existence, but that a contrary
intent was entertained." The provision in Van Alst:yne v. Van Alstyne, 28
N. Y. 375, was, "! release and acquit all and each of my children from any
charge I have made against them, or either of them." The court held that
the codicil made the will speak from the date of the codicil, and all
"charges" would be released, but that the word "charges" was not broad
enough to embrace a promissory note of one of the children, held by the
testator. But in Rhodes v. Rhodes, 176 Ill. App. 533, a codicil dated two
years after a note had been given, was held to discharge the note by republishing the will which declared that, "no note, check, book-account, or
other evidence of indebtedness shall be charged against any of my children,
unless so stated in the body of the writing''; the note in question had no
such notation.
vVII,LS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT TO MAKE A W1r.r..-ln accordance with a parol agreement that A should reside with and care for them,
B and C, his parents, executed and delivered their joint will, to become operative upon the death of the survivor. A carried out his agreement for fifteen years, until his death, after which, in spite of offers by the wife of A
to continue the agreement, B and C left the home of A, to reside with
others of their children. The father survived the son only a few months,
but between their respective deaths, a new will was made by the father an-
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nulling the rights of the heirs of A under the former will. 'fhe present
suit is brought in the life time of the mother, to enforce the contract by
declaring the property held in trust by the mother for her support but subject to the vested interests therein of the heirs of A. Held, that the relief
prayed should be granted on the grounds that a will executed under such
an agreement was contractual as well as testamentary; that the contract was
substantially performed, and to such an extent that equity would fasten a
trust upon the property for the benefit of the heirs of the beneficiary under
the contract as against any transferee or devisee. T 01·gerso11 et al. v. H a11ge
et al. (N. D. 1916), 159 N. W. 6.
The court follows what has been called "an unbroken current of authority,"
beginning in 1682 with Goilmere v. Battison, I Vern. 48, l Eq. Cas. Ab. 17,
pl. 4, to the effect that contracts to devise are valid and, if not performed.
entitle the party to whom the devise was to be made to require the devisee,
heir, or purchaser with notice from the other party, to make conveyance.
See also Jo/111so1i v. Hubbel, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, 66 Am. Dec. 782; White v.
TVitlchester, 124 Md. 518, 92 At!. 1057, Ann. Cas. l916D u56. 'fhough a will
is said to be ambulatory and revocable, and an agreement to make a will is
incapable of being specifically enforced, yet to prevent fraud, equity will
enforce the rights of the promisee by holding the executor, heir, or devisee,
a trustee to perform the contract. Bolmim v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 60 Am.
Rep. 107. Specific perfor_mance will be denied unless there is a definite and
specific agreement established. Beyer v. Schle11ller (Mo. 1915), 181 S. \V. 6g.
Though such a contract, under the statute oi frauds, must be in writing, a
part performance will avoid the statute; and where there has been full performance on the part of the promisee, equity will enforce to prevent fraud.
Whit11ey v. Hay, 181 U. S. 77, 45 L. Ed. 758. There are a few courts which
limit the cases where they will enforce specific performance to those in which
"under peculiar circumstances" plaintiff cannot be compensated in money.
Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 58o, 147 Pac. 259; Robertson v. Corcora11, 125
Minn. n8, 145 N. W. 812. See also Woods v. Dmm (Ore. 1916), 159 Pac.
n58. Where the promisee has not fully performed, but failure is due to
obstinacy of the promisor, as where after making a contract for care and
maintenance, he leaves the home of the promisee and lives with a third person, the promisee is entitled to specific performance. Bruce v. 1lfoo11, 57 S. C.
6o. A different question arises in those cases where the failure of complete
performance has not been due to interference of the promisor. In T11ssey
Y. Owens, 139 N. C. 457, the complaint was held insufficient where there was
a failure to allege specifically that plaintiff had fully performed, or to show
some legal excuse for not performing; and in Be1111et v. B11rllhalter, 257 Ill.
572, IOI N. E. l8g, 44 L. R. A. N. S. 7.33, relief 1was denied where the contract was found to have been renounced by the plaintiff. Courts are even
reluctant to give recovery on quantum meruit in these cases. Ptacek v. Pisa,
231 Ill. 522, 83 N. E. 221, 14 L. R. A. N. S. 537. The principal case is distinguishable from these cases, in that the failure to perform was not due to
the interference of the promisor, or unwillingness of the promisee. Bo11rgct
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v: Monroe, 58 Mich. 563, 25 N. W. 514; Co:r v. Co:r, 26 Grat. (67 Va.) 305;
and Snyder v. Snyder, 77 Wis. 95, 45 N. W. 8I8, are cases more directly in
_point, in each of which the death of the promisee within the lifetime of the
promisor was the cause of his failure to complete his contract.
Wms-TssTAMSNTARY lNTtNT IN OUJGRAPHIC WILL.-An unsigned letter written by deceased and addressed to his executor was fastened to siglled
sheets of writing, (which were admitted to probate as ·an olographic will),
and was enclosed with them in a sealed envelope, which was endorse<l, ·•my
last will" dated and signed. It appeared from the context of the letter that
it was written subsequent to the writing of the will. Held, that the unsigned
letter formed no part of the will,· as it was not executed with the formal
requirements of the statute, nor did there appear in the letter any intent that
it should be considered as testamentary, but was mere personal advice to the
executor. In Re Keith's Estate, (Cal. I9I6), I59 Pac. 705.
The two classes of cases in which questions concerning olographic wills
arise are, (I) whether there is a sufficient compliance with statutory requirements; (2) whether there appears an intention to :inake a testamentary writing. The writing o.ffered in the principal, case was defective in both of these
particulars. That a name written on the envelape in which the writings were
sealed, was not a signature, was also held in In re Tyrrell's Estate, I7 Ariz.
4I8, I53 Pac. 767, 14 MICH. LAW Rtv. 522. As to testamentary intent, it was
held in Smith v. Smith,' IIZ Va. 205, 70 S. E. 491, 33 L. R A. N. S. IOI8, that
it must satisfactorily appear that the testator intended the very paper to be
his will, and not a memorandum as to his intention so to dispose of his
, property. In Alston v. Davis, n8 N. C. 202, 24 S. E. 15, the deceased had
stated. in an ordinary letter to his sister that he wanted her to have all of
his property if he should die; it was held that this was~,such an expression
of his wishes as to the disposition of his property as ~ould be given effect
after his death. A letter to. his attorney, requesting that on account of his
recent marriage certain changes be made in his will was· allowed probate in
Bamey v. Hayes, II Mont. 571, 29 Pac. 282.

